PRE-CONFLICT SOKOTO:

A THREE PILLAR FRAMEWORK AND JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS OF NORTHWEST NIGERIA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

David Turner and Hilary Smith

CONF 690: Practicum in Conflict Analysis and Resolution

11 December 2014


 

Methodology

 

Nigeria is a large and diverse country.  To understand it, one must appreciate the myriad of factors that make it distinct from its neighbors.  For example, its population of 180 million people is divided in to 250 ethnic groups who speak 400 languages and dialects.  Religion further adds to its multiplicity, which further complicates understanding the country’s social dynamics.  Along with history, competition for resources and power, and a host of other ingredients and dynamics, these factors have led to the current state of affairs where an obvious economic disparity exists amongst the country’s competing groups.  At the macro level this includes the Muslim north and Christian south, and various other groups that seek access to oil revenues; at the micro-level it includes influential informal leaders, known as ogas, and elites who seek to gain and improve upon their power positions within society.  Each one of these will impact our ability to contribute in a positive way to peace build through the instruments of the private sector.

To better understand this environment and its complex systems and sub-systems—and in order to determine how and where the private sector can contribute to peace building in Nigeria—analytical tools and methodologies must be adopted to bring some semblance of structure to Nigeria’s diverse social and cultural environments.  Although many qualify, two stand out as being rather appropriate for the task of guiding our research and analysis:  these are Sandole’s Three Pillar Framework (3PF) and the U.S. military’s Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE).  In essence, 3PF is our map that directs us to key landmarks while JIPOE is the compass that keeps our azimuth straight.  Finally, the analytical tools we use, such as social and economic theories, including basic human needs, relative deprivation, and rentierism, are the lenses that allow us to appreciate these landmarks with greater clarity.

Sandole’s 3PF, like the U.S. Military’s JIPOE, is essentially a checklist that provides the analyst an azimuth to map “any particular conflict as a basis for responding to it in an effective manner.”[1]  3PF consists of three pillars, which divide the conflict analysis effort in to three distinct lines of effort.  Pillar 1 (conflict elements) is the “situational awareness” phase where the analyst seeks to understand the key parties involved and their roles within the conflict (i.e. substance and structure), the conflict’s nature (i.e. latent versus manifest), how each actor or group operates within its environment, and so on.  In Pillar 2 (conflict causes and conditions) the analyst evaluates the “conflicts underlying causes and conditions.”[2]  Here the analyst examines the conflicts drivers, which may be rooted or influenced by factors at the individual, societal, international, or global/ecological levels.  In Pillar 3 (conflict [third-party] intervention), third party groups operationalize an intervention plan based upon the research and analytical results learned in Pillars 1 and 2.  Based on this research and results, a conflict intervention may range from conflict prevention to conflict transformation.

The U.S. Military’s “…JIPOE process provides a disciplined methodology for applying a holistic view of the operational environment to the analysis of adversary capabilities and intentions.”[3]  It also acts as a checklist to guide research and analysis, and to formulate a plan of action.

JIPOE consists of four steps.  The JIPOE process’s first three steps provide the decision-makers and their staff personnel “…a holistic view of the operational environment” that analyzes the operational environment’s impact, assesses the adversary’s doctrine and capabilities, and identifies its key vulnerabilities and decisive points.[4]  The JIPOE process’s fourth step “…builds upon this holistic view to develop a detailed understanding of the adversary’s probable intent and future strategy.”[5]

In JIPOE Step 1 (Define the Operational Environment), the planner seeks to define the physical boundaries in which the operation will occur.  The planner considers the various aspects of the operational environment, to include the current mission’s goals and timeframe, as well as issues or hazards that could disrupt the mission.  It is important to note that JIPOE Step 1 has no direct equivalent to the 3PF process.  In reality, the action agency and/or those with insider knowledge of the operational environment processes probably carried out this process in advance through formal and informal collaboration events.

In JIPOE Step 2 (Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment), a military planner “evaluate[s] the impact of the operational environment on adversary, friendly, and neutral military capabilities and broad [courses of action].”[6]  In our capacity as peace builders, we must do the same—although with an obvious civilian focus.  And like a military planner, we must be cognizant of the Operational Environment’s (OE) potential disruptors, obstructionists, and hazards.  As in Sandole’s 3PF Pillar 2, JIPOE Step 2 helps us to identify the OE’s formal and informal conditions, systems, and networks that contribute to the conflict, whether latent or manifest.  It also helps focus analysis on the OE’s physical and non-physical components.  An example of the former might be a system or nodal analysis of a city-state’s internet or cell phone network.  An example of the latter may include a social network analysis of how communication flows between individuals and groups determine how information is sent, received, perceived, and processed.  Combined, JIPOE Step 2 and Sandole’s 3PF Pillar 2 provide a thorough approach in the identification of relevant OE topics and vital data that aid the conflict interventionist in the mission planning effort.

In JIPOE Step 3 (Evaluate the Adversary), the planner “identifies and evaluates the adversary’s capabilities and limitations, current situation, [Centers of Gravity] COGs, and the doctrine, patterns of operation, and tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by adversary forces, absent those constraints identified during step two.”[7] In other words, this step aids the conflict analyst in the identification and evaluation of the OE’s individual players and groups in isolation—without consideration of external forces that may affect their activities or performance.  A very basic example of this step would be to compare it to a football team’s tryout roster.  In addition to player names and positions, it may also include individual ability scores (e.g. how fast can they can sprint 50m and 100m) and other specialized data (e.g. the ability to throw or catch efficiently; whether they are left or right-handed; or whether their temperaments are aggressive or non-aggressive).  JIPOE Step 3 is very similar to Sandole’s 3PF Pillar 1 in that it recognizes and identifies key actors and groups—along with their unique characteristics, motivations, and modus operandi—which are paramount to understanding the nuances of any OE.

Conflict planners devise conflict intervention strategies in JIPOE Step 4 and 3PF Pillar 3.  In each of these methodology’s final steps, the conflict planner uses the assessments and information gathered in the previous steps/pillars as a basis to formulate strategy.  In JIPOE Step 4 (Determine Adversary Courses of Action), “… [the planner] builds upon this holistic view to develop a detailed understanding of the adversary’s probable intent and future strategy.”  This is framed in the context of how the adversary will react in relation to the friendly forces’ actions.  In other words, if friendly forces conduct an action, the adversary will in turn conduct a reaction, which will cause friendly forces to conduct a counter-action.  Hence, the “war gaming” process is intended to provide some predictability in an adversary’s behavior.  Note:  for more accurate results it is best to have a knowledgeable person portray the adversary, as they will have a more nuanced understanding of how a real-life adversary would react.

The outcome of JIPOE Step 4 will provide the conflict planner with a greater knowledge base that will remove uncertainty, provide predictability, and make apparent the resources required.  In theory, this will allow him or her to prepare a comprehensive conflict intervention strategy.

As previously mentioned, 3PF acts as a map that guides us to key conflict analysis landmarks while JIPOE is the compass that directs our path.  We will now discuss some the analytical tools that have allowed us to observe these landmarks with greater clarity.  The key tools we used comprised conflict elements in Sandole’s Pillar 1.  JIPOE Step 3 (Evaluate the Adversary) can be used to focus in on the landmarks provided by 3PF Pillar 1. These landmarks from Pillar 1 include parties, their issues, objectives, means, and conflict handling styles, as well as the conflict environment.  These landmarks are described below.

Parties

Conflict parties are individuals or groups that participate in the conflict or have some association or involvement in it.  Conflict parties have at least three important characteristics to understand: 1) their representation, 2) their internal structure, and 3) their relation to external structures[8]. Conflict planners and practitioners ascertain if a party is representing itself or being represented by another party.  Understanding this aspect helps the planners know if they will be working directly with a possibly traumatized victim group or with their advocacy NGO group.  This helps determine the playing field for interacting with these parties.  It is equally important to understand the internal structure of each party.  Few parties, even single-person parties, are monolithic with no internal divisions, dueling motivations, or complex goals.  Finally, studying each party’s relationship to the external structure often reveals imbalances in power.[9]  If an external structure, such as a legal system, economy, educational system, or other institution, promotes an inequitable distribution of rights, privileges, wealth, protections, or opportunities, it becomes a structurally violent system.  Structural violence is when a system is set up so that it favors one party or group over others strictly based on identity rather than merit. [10]

Issues

Issues are what the conflict is taking place over and can be classified as realistic or nonrealistic.[11]  Coser describes realistic issues as issues about something tangible while nonrealistic issues are emotional and about “letting off steam” (Coser 1956).[12]  Realistic issues are predominated by ownership of territory.  Nonrealistic issues are emotional expressions through aggression.  Satisfying nonrealistic issues is found through aggressive acts.  Realistic and nonrealistic issues can interplay and feed into each other as either displaced conflicts or misattributed conflict. Displaced conflict is where nonrealistic issues remain after a realistic one is resolved. An example of displaced conflict is when Israel withdrew from settlements in Gaza, however, ill feelings remained because of the hurt feelings from negative interactions while settlers and Gazans rubbed shoulders.  Misattributed conflict is where an unsatisfied nonrealistic issue may spill over into a realistic conflict.[13]  This is seen in political Islamist groups feeling inundated in corrupt culture begin to act violently in order to preserve or remake culture and society to standards they agree with.

Objectives

Objectives or goals of parties are simplified into two categories: maintaining the status quo or changing the status quo.[14]  Ascertaining the objectives of parties included in JIPOE Step 3 is key to determining where parties are aligning and where they are clashing.

Means

Means are the methods or ways in which parties engage in conflict to achieve their goals.[15]  Rapoport describes these means as fights, games, and debates.[16]  Each method adopts a different viewpoint of conflict parties, which then determines the rules and interactions they play out.  In fights, a party characterizes another party as an enemy and the means of conquering or destroying the other are adopted.  Games are adopted where parties frame the other as opponents to be outwitted.  Intelligence and espionage activities usually frame parties in this way.  Finally, debates are means where parties see each other as interlocuters and tools of persuasion are used.  Diplomats and sometimes politicians use debates as their principle means to engage in conflict[17]

Preferred Conflict Handling Orientations

How parties chose to conduct themselves in conflict is important for planners to know so they offer interventions that adapt to these orientations.  These orientations are elucidated by and are based on the prisoners’ dilemma.[18] These styles consist of five orientations on a grid. One axis contains a spectrum of concern for self and the other axis a spectrum for concern for relationship.

Figure 1 Preferred conflict handling styles  [19]

Avoidant parties do not engage in conflict and may ignore its existence.  Those with an Accommodation style may appease other parties. A classic example of accommodation is British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlin’s appeasement measures with Germany, declaring “peace for our time” shortly before the outbreak of WWII.  Competitive or confrontational parties use force or coercion to obtain their objectives.  Most combatants in armed engagements exemplify this style.  Compromising parties meet other parties in the middle, which often results in a lukewarm arrangement that is what neither party wants and usually enjoys only weak support.  Finally, collaborative parties engage with other parties to create solutions that are mutually beneficial.  Problem-solving workshops or dialogues can foster communication that makes collaborative problem solving possible.

A party’s preferred conflict style may be different from its practiced conflict style.  For instance, an ethnic group may culturally prefer accommodation, however, an environment may have become so intolerable that the group is employing competitive/confrontational styles to obtain its objectives.  Planners who know a party’s preferred style may be able to frame an intervention in such a way to relieve pressure and allow parties to better handle their conflicts.

Conflict Environment

Conflict environment describes the context in which conflict takes place and whether or not it is an endogenous or exogenous system (Sandole 67).  Conflict environment includes the political, economic, cultural, social, historical, environmental, or institutional space a conflict plays out in.  The environment is like a stage that set parameters for what is possible and what kinds of effects are possible.  An example of environment affecting conflict is the lack of governance in Iraq following the war.  Weak governing structures was one factor that led to an open stage for ISIS and other extremist groups to gain a footing.  Endogenous and exogenous systems are ways of describing conflict environments and were advanced by Rapoport (1974).[20]  Endogenous systems are environments that have stabilization and conflict resolution methods and mechanisms in place.  An example of this is the US legal system.  If a law is broken or someone has a legal complaint against another party, there are set procedures and systems for addressing that conflict.  Exogenous systems lack these mechanisms.  The international system has bodies like the UN and ICC, it is still an anarchic system and serves as a good example of an exogenous system.  The conflict environment element of Pillar 1 can also play into Pillar 2 in 3PF (Conflict Causes and Conditions) and JIPOE Step 2 as well.

Gaps

We recognize that this cannot be a comprehensive survey of all issues and conflict factors in Nigeria. Below is bulleted a list of issues we purposely left out of this analysis:

  • Economy – because the nature of our PBPSI is economic, we will first survey the region and once we design an sector to create an intervention for, study the economics for that particular segment of society.
  • AMCP not present – we also acknowledge that our chosen region in Sokoto does not yet have an Aggressive Manifest Conflict Process. Both of our analysis methods are better designed for AMCP.  However, both JIPOE and 3PF can be adapted to pre-conflict or conflict-threat areas, such as Sokoto.  We chose the Sokoto region because there was no AMCP and a commerce based PBPSI could more easily make an impact than in an area where security is threatened.

 

Overview

 

Nigeria is very diverse in terms of its weather and climate, terrain, natural resources, and human geography.  It’s weather and climate varies regionally—not only from north to south—but from east to west.  As a result, some regions receive higher temperatures with less rainfall while others receive moderate temperatures with average rainfall.  Climate change is also a key factor and has negatively impacted several ecosystems, particularly in the north.  Nigeria’s terrain also differs greatly by region.  It comprises high plains (or plateaus), valleys, mountains, swampy terrain and rain forests, extremely arid regions, and two major water sources.  In addition to oil, Nigeria’s natural resources include numerous types of precious metals and stones.  But perhaps most diverse of all is the country’s human terrain.  Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa.  It has over 250 ethnic groups that speak over 400 languages.  The country also lies at the crossroads of many historical smuggling and trade routes.

As previously discussed, our peace-building private sector initiative (PBPSI) focuses on Nigeria’s north central and northwest regions.  We define these regions as our Area of Operations (AO).  This AO is where we believe our PBPSI activities occur.  For this reason, discussion on geography and other topics within our AO will be more detailed.  Conversely, discussions on geography and other topics external to our AO will receive less or no attention.  The idea is to focus on the AO and any factors that influence it.  It is important to note that at this point in our process, we are past the “discovery” phase:  we have already chosen where we wish to operate.  Hence, a detailed discussion on the entire country is unnecessary.

Introduction

Nigeria, located in West Africa, shares borders with several countries: in the west with the Republic of Benin, in the east with Chad and Cameroon, and to the north with Niger.  It’s southern coast lies on the Gulf of Guinea, which feeds in to the Atlantic Ocean.  In terms of landmass, Nigeria covers an area roughly twice the size of California.  This ranks it as number 32 in the world in terms of land mass, with total area coverage of about 910,800 square/km.  Its arable land use is estimated at 40%, its permanent crop use is around 3.5%, while Nigerians use the remainder for various other reasons[21] (e.g. mining, cities, private ownership, etc.).  In terms of terrain, Nigeria’s southern lowlands merge into central hills and plateaus.  Its mountains are located in the southeast while its plains are located in the north.

Weather and Climate

Nigeria’s weather and climate vary by region.  Generally, it has four climate types that are heavily impacted by rainfall:  1) Sahel, 2) Tropical Dry, 3) Tropical Humid, and 4) Equatorial or Rainforest.  The Sahel is a band of semi-arid land that stretches from the Gambia and Senegal in the west to Sudan and northern Eritrea in the east.  Nigeria’s northern most regions fall within this band.  In Nigeria, the Tropical Dry Zone (TDZ) stretches east-west, south of the Sahel band.  Its southern limits run through the country’s center, just south of the Bida-Abuja-Jalingo line.  The Tropical Humid Zone (THZ) runs south of the TDZ.  Its southernmost limit runs east-west along the Benin City-Enugu line.  Finally, the Equatorial or Rainforest Zone runs east-west, south of the THZ.[22]

The Sahel region’s climate is much more extreme than in the south.  Warmer temperatures combined with lower rainfall overtime have caused soil erosion, insufficient irrigation, deforestation, desertification, and drought.[23]  Part of this is due to a relatively short rainy season, which only lasts between June-September.  Between October-April there is virtually no rainfall.  In July-August, the regions peak rainfall period, precipitation only averages between 5-6 inches per month.  And each month only experiences precipitation an average of 13 days.  Temperature highs in Sokoto, Nigeria’s largest northern city affected by Sahel climate, average 36 degrees Celsius (97 degrees Fahrenheit) annually; annual temperature lows average 22 degrees Celsius (71 degrees Fahrenheit).  This extreme weather’s net effect has deteriorated the region’s ecosystem, destroyed wide swaths of agriculture, displaced thousands of Nigerians, and further contributed to the country’s poverty and instability.

On its Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) 2015, Maplecroft ranked Nigeria as the fourth (tied for third with South Sudan) most at risk country for conflict and civil unrest, behind Bangladesh and Sierra Leone.[24]   It highlighted Nigeria’s northern region as being particularly at risk due to “widespread drought and food insecurity that helped create the socio-economic conditions that led to the emergence of Boko Haram.”[25]  The CCVI based its rank system on population sensitivity, a country’s physical exposure (presumably to climate change), and its governmental capacity to adapt to climate change over the next 30 years.  It cited Nigeria as a prime example of where a country’s inability to adapt to climate change could contribute to such negative consequences as poverty, migration, reduced levels of education, “which in turn can lead to disenfranchisement of certain communities and drive support for radical groups.”[26]

The Tropical Dry Zone (TDZ), the climate band that extends between the Sahel and Tropic Humid Zones (THZ), also falls within our proposed areas of operations.  Its climate is harsh but not as extreme as the Sahel’s.  Those who live in the TDZ experience lengthy dry seasons that tend to last up to seven months.  Their wet seasons generally last between 3-5 months and are characterized by heavy rainfall.  Kaduna, a major city that falls within the TDZ, averages between 0-2.5 inches of rainfall six months out of the year.  Conversely, it averages 3-11 inches the remainder of the year.  Of relevance is that throughout these high precipitation periods, Kaduna’s average high temperatures noticeably drop.  This results in a replenishment period for the area’s ecosystem.  Kaduna’s average annual high temperature is 31.5 degrees Celsius (88.7 degrees Fahrenheit); its average annual low is 18.5 degrees Celsius (65 degrees Fahrenheit).

By comparison, cities in the TDZ are markedly more hospitable than those in the Sahel.  Kaduna is cooler than Sokoto by average annual high of 5 degrees Celsius (10 degrees Fahrenheit).  It is less cool than Sokoto by an average annual low of 3.5 degrees Celsius (5.5 degrees Fahrenheit).

Water Sources

Nigeria has two major rivers and numerous water tributaries and distributaries.  Its largest rivers are the Niger and the Benue.  The Niger River enters the country at the Niger, Benin, and Nigeria tri-border area and into our area of operation (AO).  From there, it flows southeast through Kebbi, Niger, and Kwara states.  While at the Kebbi-Niger state border area, the river flows in to the Kainji Reservoir where the Kainji Dam generates and distributes 760 megawatts of electrical power to the region.  As the river continues to flow west of Abuja, it travels approximately 125km (78 miles) southeast to the Lokoja confluence, where it forks in to a southern direction and eastern direction.  Along its southern path, it remains the Niger River and extends approximately 300km (190 miles) where it deposits in to the Niger River delta.  Along its eastern path, the Niger River turns in to the Benue River.  The Benue River continues east-northeast through the eastern part of the country and on in to Cameroon.

The Niger River, along with the Sokoto-Rima River and Kaduna River Basins, creates countless tributaries and distributaries throughout our AO (see Figure 1).  However, extreme temperature and human activity have desiccated many of its lakes, streams, creaks, rivers, and ponds.  USAID writes that:

 

Access to clean water and improved sanitation facilities is a daily challenge for many Nigerians. This problem is particularly acute in northern Nigeria, where only 30 percent of the population has access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation. This contributes to high prevalence of waterborne diseases, threatens the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, and contributes to low levels of school enrollment, especially among girls.[27]

 

Figure 2 Hydrological Map of Nigeria[28]

JIPOE Step 1 – Vegetation

 

Rainfall greatly influences where flora grows.  But soil, elevation, and human activities are also factors.  As noted above in our climate discussion, the Sahel and TDZ climates dominate our AO.  As such, distinct vegetation bands fall within each.  Sahel and Short Grass Savannah fall within the Sahel climate zone.  In these more arid regions, grass is dry, sparse, and often less than six inches in height.  Farmers in northern states are unable to efficiently grow vegetables; but many grow rice, corn, and assorted beans. In the dryer Savannah areas short grasses with sparsely separated trees dominate.  In the Short Grass Savannah band, grass is more prevalent and longer, and trees are less sparse.  In these Savannah areas, farmers grow major grains, grasses, tubers, vegetables, and cotton.  Woodland and Tall Grass Savannah fall within the TDZ climate zone.  With increased precipitation, flora becomes more abundant.  Grass can grow six to eight feet.  Trees are small-leaved and mostly deciduous, which means they shed their leaves annually.  Kaduna state falls within this band.  Its farmers grow “cash crops like rice, cassava, ginger, potatoes, millet, groundnut, shea-nut, benni-seed and soya beans…”[29]

Natural Resources

Other than oil, which is found in the country’s southern delta region, Nigeria has a wide variety of natural resources.  These natural resources include metals such as gold, lead, and zinc.  They also include such valuable stones as marble, Gypsum, and limestone.  Many of these metals and stones have created industry and income throughout the country.  Of particular relevance is the Nigerian Government’s promotion of its vast resource wealth.  It openly encourages outsiders to invest in the country.  From a peace builder’s perspective, such openness is welcomed.  Other countries, such as Sudan and Libya, do not yet offer such access.  A breakdown, by state, of where these metals and stones are found in our AO and AI are listed in Figure 2.

Figure 3 Nigerian States and their Natural Resources[30]

Nigeria’s People and Ethnic Groups

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country with 180 million people.  This ranks it the seventh most populous country in the world.  Nigerian’s speak 400 dialects and languages, and can be divided in to more than 250 ethnic groups.  The largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, which comprise 70% of the population.[31]  Another ten-percent comprises groups that number more than 1 million members each.  They include the Kanuri, the Tiv, and the Ibibio.[32]  Nigeria’s literacy rate is about average when compared to other African countries—but low by Western standards.  Just 61.3% (72% males and 50% female) are literate (e.g. over the age of 15 and can read and write).[33]  In regards to religion, approximately 50% are Muslim, 40% are Christian, with the remainder a mixture of indigenous and hybrid religions, according to the CIA Factbook.  Of relevance is that most Muslims live in Nigeria’s north while most Christians live in the south.  This hodge-podge of ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences has, at times, contributed to extreme violence amongst the country’s competing groups.  This fact becomes more salient when one considers that almost 63% of Nigeria’s population is under 24 years of age.[34]

In our Area of Operations in Nigeria’s northwest, the population becomes less dissimilar.  The Hausa and Fulani are the dominant group and have remained so since Nigeria gained independence in 1960.  They are the region’s most populous and politically influential ethnic group—and arguably have the most political influence within the central government.  The Gwari and Nupe are the other noted ethnic groups in our AO.[35]  Several smaller mixed linguistic groups also reside in our AO.

Population Centers

Almost half of Nigeria’s population lives in urban areas.  Several of its larger cities are located in the country’s north and northwest.  Kano, the second most populated city in Nigeria, has over 3.6 million inhabitants.  Abuja, ranked number three, has 3 million.  And Kaduna, ranked number five, has over 1.6 million.  See Figure 3 for the cities in our AO with a population of over 100,000 inhabitants.

Figure 4 City in North-Northwest Nigeria with 100k+ Population[36]

Religion

Islam is the dominant religion in Nigeria’s twelve northern states—to include all the states in our AO.  Prior to the 1960s, northern Muslims enforced strict Sharia penal codes that included amputations and floggings.[37]  But independence and secular institutions replaced this 700-year old tradition.  Forty years later, after crime and corruption reportedly spiraled out of control, Nigeria’s northern leaders demanded Sharia be re-implemented.

It is difficult to determine if Sharia’s enactment has exacerbated tensions between Muslims and Christians.  Violent and non-violent conflict has existed between these groups and their ethnic sub-groups for hundreds of years.  Some scholars argue that competition over the presidency, oil profits, and other issues has intensified competition at all levels and ethnic groups.  Others believe that Sharia in the northern twelve states has pacified many who might otherwise view secular institutions as immoral.  This may perhaps be the reason Boko Haram’s insurgency has been largely contained to Nigeria’s northeastern regions, where support amongst their Kanuri base remains strong.  Regardless, religious implications will be an important factor in our PBPSI’s courses of action.

Now that we have a firm grounding in the operational environment of northwest Nigeria in particular and Nigeria in general, we will turn from JIPOE Step 1 to Pillar 1 of the 3 Pillar Framework (3PF).

Parties

Central Government

Nigeria’s political status quo is fragile.  Since it gained independence in 1960, the country has had a long history of coups and military rule.  It has only been in recent years that some semblance of political normalcy has prevailed.  The country has a representative government modeled after that of the United States; Britain’s Parliamentary system also influences it.  But the political class has effectively manipulated the country’s political, economic, and social structures to their advantage.  As a result, an obvious disequilibrium exists between its ruling elite and its everyday citizens.  This discord has given rise to numerous militant groups and a general feeling of mistrust toward the government.

By comparison, Nigeria’s central government resembles that of most inclusive democracies.  It consists of three distinct branches:  the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial.  The president heads the Executive Branch and acts as the Head of State and Head of Government.  In his duties as the latter, he oversees and influences dozens of federal ministries that range from the Ministry of Agriculture to Ministry of Youth Development.  The bicameral National Assembly makes up the Legislative Branch, which is the highest elective law-making body in the country.[38]  It comprises a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives.[39]  And the Judiciary Branch oversees country’s legal matters.  Its offices closely resemble that of the U.S. as it has a Supreme Court, National Judicial Council, Federal High Court, Court of Appeals, and a Magistrate Court System.

Nigeria’s state structure is very similar to that of the United States (U.S.).  It has 36 states instead of 50.  These states are further subdivided in to 774 local governments, which are similar to U.S. counties.  It also has a capital region that resembles Washington D.C., known as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in Abuja.

From an external perspective, these Western-modeled institutions give the appearance of stability; but this could not be further from the truth.  Many, if not all, watch dog groups and organizations that monitor good governance around the globe describes Nigeria as teetering on the brink of state failure.  And the myriads of academics and practitioners that have written on Nigeria over the past decade conclude, for the most part, that its weak political institutions have created an “unstable peace” or “latent conflict”[40] environment where competing elites prosper and commoners struggle.

Nowhere is competition amongst competing elites fiercer than over who controls the executive branch.  Struggle for the presidency began in 1963, at the onset of Nigeria’s self-governance.  And only a few times since has an orderly transition of power occurred.  Of the ten presidents that have led Nigeria since this period, their opponents helped depose five, forced three to resign, and assassinated one.  One died in office due to natural causes.  The lack of a peaceful transition through democratic processes is significant as it indicates an inherent disregard by elites for public opinion.  The incentive to hold the highest power in the land is a natural one as Paul Wehr notes:  “social life is above all a struggle for power and status regardless of the type of structure.”[41]  But in Nigeria’s case, strong presidential links not only equate to greater political influence, but to oil revenues and other income sources.

Nigeria’s National Assembly and Judicial System are no different.  It is of no surprise that many politicians run for office not for the public good, but for personal enrichment.  As a result, Nigerians tend to view their politicians and even their courts systems with derision and disdain.  In its Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Transparency International captured many Nigerian’s attitudes and perceptions toward their country’ public servants and institutions.  The percentage of Nigerians who ranked either as ‘corrupt’ or ‘extremely corrupt’ was quite high:  94% felt this way about their political parties; almost 75% believed this about their National Assembly members; almost 70% believed this in regards to their public officials and civil servants.[42]  The same report noted that 92% of the Nigerians polled viewed their police forces as ‘corrupt’ or ‘extremely corrupt’ and almost a quarter admitted to have paid bribes to various members of their court system.[43]

The relevance of these highly negative perceptions is in the context in which they are viewed.    [As Gurr notes, deprivation—in Nigeria’s case political participation is relative]– and The World Bank (WB) rates Nigeria as a ‘lower-middle class income’ country in its Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only) category.[44][45]  The WB also reports that 46% of Nigerian’s live at the poverty line.[46]  With a $520 billion Gross Domestic Product (USD), it is clear there exists a sizeable disparity between upper and lower income classes.  This becomes more apparent when one considers that Nigeria’s middle class is only estimated at 8.1 percent of its total population.[47]  Hence, we conclude that for a large portion of those surveyed there is an existent manifest conflict process (MCP)[48] environment.  [unit of analysis is not clear; earlier I discussed Sokoto and now I am discussing the MCP in Nigeria as a whole]

Arguably, the factors that have contributed most to this environment are corruption and cronyism.  Both run rampant throughout Nigeria’s political and economic institutions—and have created unfortunate consequences for the country.  Hints of the magnitude and extent of Nigeria’s corruption are not infrequently glimpsed in the local and international media.  For example, in May 2014, news agencies reported on a story that captured both corruption and cronyism within the country’s highest offices:

 

Nigeria’s endemic corruption, meanwhile, remains as entrenched as ever. In April, Lamido Sanusi, then the highly respected central bank governor, made public records demonstrating that at least $20 billion had disappeared from accounts at the state-run Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) — a shortfall equivalent to nearly double the GDP of Zimbabwe.  Sanusi was summarily fired by President Goodluck Jonathan, who accused him of “financial recklessness” while in office.  Sanusi then filed suit against the president, saying Jonathan had violated the constitutionally enshrined autonomy of the central bank.  But on May 20, a court dismissed Sanusi’s suit, saying that the dispute was a matter of contract law between an employer and employee, and not a constitutional matter.[49]

 

In 2014, Transparency International ranked Nigeria 144th out of 177 on its most transparent countries list.[50]  And on its “Fragile State Index – 2014,” the Fund for Peace (FFP) ranked it number 17 (of 177) on its most fragile state list.[51]  These reports provide useful signposts that point out Nigeria’s trajectory, as well as its core issues.  Both of which help us as conflict revolutionists to plan peace-building interventions.

The FFP uses twelve indicators to measure a state’s fragility.  Each provides a useful lens to view how poor governance and other factors have impacted a country.  In Nigeria’s case, many of these indicators can at least be indirectly linked to government corruption and cronyism.  It is relevant to note that the FFP rates Nigeria as “Poor” in eight, “Weak” in three, and “Moderate” in just one of its twelve indicators.  This is significant as the conflation of these poor ratings suggest—like the attitudes of those Transparency International polled—an existent manifest conflict process (MCP), where two or more groups “pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals through means designed to undermine the decision-making efficacy of one another.”[52]

Nigeria’s deep-rooted corruption and cronyism can be indirectly linked to several Fragile State Index indicators.  Perhaps the most obvious is the Uneven Economic Development indicator, which the FFP ranks Nigeria fifth globally.  With this indicator, the FFP measures a government’s commitment to the social contract.  It takes in to account such factors as ethnic, religious, and regional factors in relation to slum population, access to improved services, and income share.  State Legitimacy is another indicator.  It factors in such issues as corruption, government effectiveness, protests and demonstrations, and power struggles.  Of great significance is that each of these indicators is intertwined with the others.  The aggregate consequences negatively impact one another over time in a cyclical manner, which further contributes to a negative spiral of normative perceptions, particularly corruption.

Uneven Economic Development is one of Nigeria’s most obvious social blemishes.  As of 2012, an estimated 61% of Nigerians lived in “absolute poverty.”[53][54]  This was a six-percent increase from 2004.[55]  Yet the World Bank (WB) estimated Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at $462,979,245,902 for that year.[56]  In the subsequent year (2013), the WB estimated Nigeria’s GDP at $521,803,314,654.[57]  This ranked it in the top 23 countries for GDP, just behind Sweden, Argentina, and Switzerland.[58]  Yet the UNDP currently (2014) estimates the country’s poverty rate to be at 62.6%.[59]  With these figures, it is clear that there is a significant economic disparity gap between elites and the poor—and that its political representatives are largely responsible.  Perhaps the most relevant factor is that a vast majority of Nigerians acknowledge and understand this dynamic.  Hence, there is a clear indication of an existent Manifest Conflict Process (MCP), writ large.  This creates a predicament for the Nigerian Government.  Several groups—such as Boko Haram and Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)—have chosen violence to openly challenge the state.  The resultant Aggressive Manifest Conflict Process (AMCP) increases the possibility that AMCP will spread.

In regards to State Legitimacy, one could easily argue that Nigeria has a legitimacy crisis.  Most individuals and groups, from its citizenry to regional and international investors, view it as a state with weak institutions caused by inefficient governance and high-level corruption.  Headlines, such as the disappearance of $20-50 billion from state coffers, reinforce these notions and bolster the MCP environment.  The state already suffers from a negative cognitive environment where the average citizen affords it little credibility.

External corporations and businesses also observe these symptoms.  In 2012, the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) ranked Nigeria 40th out of 58 countries for Resource Governance.[60]  The report gave “Failing” scores in the Enabling Environment and Reporting Practices categories.  In the former, Nigeria received “Failing” scores in all five categories: Corruption, Open Budget, Accountability and Democracy, Government Effectiveness, and Rule of Law.  The bottom line is that corruption likely turned away an untold number foreign investors.  In the daily media, they read about corruption at the highest government echelons.  Stories such as the reported disappearance of $20-50 billion dollars in oil revenue and President Goodluck Jonathan’s suspension of Nigeria’s central bank governor for its announcement are not uncommon.  Headlines such as these only add to the long history of perceived corruption amongst Nigeria’s political elite.  Perhaps most tangible, especially for Nigeria’s northern Muslims, is the noticeable economic disparity they experience when compared to southern Christians.  These differences become particularly salient in election season as northern politicians reinforce identity groups in their bid for executive and legislative political positions.

Boko Haram’s operations throughout the country undermine the Nigerian Government’s legitimacy in several ways.  They reveal that the state is unable to defeat an insurgent group—and therefore do not own the monopoly on lethal force within the country.  This is of particular concern as the group has become progressively stronger over the past 5-6 years.  Newsworthy events, such as kidnap operations against its citizens and political assassinations, demonstrate that government forces are unable to provide necessary security.  They also create interest in the group and provide a soundboard for anti-government propaganda.

Sokoto Caliphate

The Sokoto Caliphate is the spiritual center for the majority of Muslims living in northern Nigeria.  In its prime, between ~1808-1903, the Sokoto Caliphate became one of the largest empires on the African continent.  It also became “…the center of politics and economics in the region until it fell to French and British colonial armies in the early 20th Century.”[61]  Although it has no constitutional authority today, its historical impact and spiritual influence continue to affect numerous aspects of Nigeria’s political, economic, and social environment.

Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817) established the Sokoto Caliphate in 1809.  After Muslim Hausa city state leaders exiled him from Gobir (a northern Nigerian city state) in 1804, he raised an army of Fulani and Hausa supporters to wage an insurgency against them.  Between 1804-1808, dan Fodio and his army defeated most of the independent Hausa state rulers in the north and established Sokoto as their capital.[62]  Between 1808-1815, the Sokoto Caliphate consolidated its gains and ruled the semi-autonomous group of city-states that “…included most of what is now northern Nigeria and northern Cameroon, as well as parts of Niger.”[63]

Between 1808-1903, the Sokoto Caliphate expanded its influence throughout the region.  Usman dan Fodio, known as the Commander of the Faithful, ruled the Sokoto Caliphate until his death 1817.  His son, Mohammed Bello, succeeded him.  A short period afterward, “A dispute between Bello and his uncle, Abdullahi, resulted in a nominal division of the caliphate into eastern and western divisions, although the supreme authority of Bello as caliph was upheld.”[64]  These caliphs, and those that succeeded them, expanded the caliphate to include over 30 loosely aligned emirates by 1900.  However, their grip on power disappeared with the introduction of European interests on the African continent.

The British established Frederick Lugard as northern Nigeria’s high commissioner in 1900.  By 1903, they had nullified the Sokoto Caliphate’s political power, which essentially relegated it to an Islamic spiritual center—albeit one with great influence.  In this critical period, Lord Lugard compelled the region’s indigenous rulers to accept Britain’s authority and to not infringe upon its economic interests.  He also checked French interests in the region and secured access to valuable resources for the home country.  This lasted until the late 1950s and early 1960s when the colonial powers departed Nigeria and the African continent en masse.  This transition period did little for the Sokoto Caliphate, as it restored none of its pre-1903 authority.  Instead, Nigeria’s new constitution created a secular government that created little space for Islam.  But its religious influences remained strong.

The caliphate continues to exert influence over many facets of Nigeria’s socio-political and religious landscape.  In some ways it has been positive; in others it has not.  For example, the social and economic disparity between the Muslim north and Christian south has an indirect link to it.  As former American Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell writes, “the British insulated [the caliphate] from Christian missionaries and their modernizing schools and hospitals, condemning the region [the Muslim north] to economic and social backwardness in comparison with the rest of the federation that persists to this day.”[65]  Boko Haram, which currently wages a significant anti-corruption insurgency against the Nigerian Government, names dan Fodio as a key inspiration for its cause.[66]  As such they often cite dan Fodio in their propaganda messages.  The Sultan of Sokoto, the caliphate’s spiritual head and Nigeria’s senior most Muslim leader, wields notable influence over the country’s politics.  Many view him as a force for unity, particularly in the current environment where some politicians have questioned the need to remain a united country should President Goodluck Jonathan win re-election.

Boko Haram

Boko Haram (BH) is a major contributor to social unrest within Nigeria.  Since 2011 the group has killed thousands of Nigerians and its actions have displaced hundreds of thousands.  Over the past few years, BH has orchestrated several large-scale, newsworthy events that have given it exposure in the international media.  Its popularity within Nigeria varies depending on region, ethnicity, religion, and other cultural and social factors.  Regardless, their insurgency against the Government of Nigeria has helped create cleavages between Nigeria’s Muslim north and Christian south.

Boko Haram is a Sunni-based jihadist extremist group that is largely inspired by 14th century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah.  The group’s official name is “Jama‘atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da‘awati wal-Jihad” or “Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad.”[67] The moniker Boko Haram translates as, “Western education is a sin,” which the group rejects.  The group adheres to a strict interpretation of Sharia Law, as can be witnessed in most of its activities and propaganda videos.  Boko Haram uses Islam as a mechanism to mobilize and to actuate its support base.  As will be discussed later, the group’s basic tenets are to reject and defend against Western influences and to replicate a society similar to that of the Prophet Mohammed in the mid-600s A.D.

The group’s origins date back to the late 1990s when it became known as the Nigerian Taliban (NT).  In an effort to divorce itself from the “corrupt,” “sinful,” and “unjust” secular government, it formed a community based on Islamic law in the remote Yobe State, located in Nigeria’s northeast.”[68]  A short period later Nigerian security forces disbanded the group due to disputes it had with local communities.  However, in December 2003, NT initiated an insurgency against the Government of Nigeria with attacks on police stations in the Yobe State.  Between 2003-2009, NT expanded its attacks on targets it deemed “un-Islamic,” such as police, military, and government buildings and personnel.  But after Nigerian security forces captured and killed NT’s leader, Muhammad Yusuf, in July 2009, their attack profile shifted and became much more violent and organized.

Abubakr Shekau assumed command of Boko Haram shortly after Yusuf’s murder.  He swiftly changed the group’s attack priorities to include Western-associated targets.[69]  Prior to Shekau’s leadership, NT’s terror attacks included relatively few Christian targets.  This radically changed under his leadership.  This shift and the group’s new propaganda themes earned it the nickname Boko Haram.

Over the past five years, Boko Haram have created and sustained violent conditions throughout Nigeria’s north, and to a lesser degree in its south.  According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Boko Haram has carried out over 800 attacks that resulted in 3,665 fatalities between 2009-2013.[70]  This ranks it as the third most deadly extremist group, behind only the Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).[71]  And according to Voice of America: “The U.N. says nearly 500,000 people in northern Nigeria have fled their homes in fear of what it calls an “increasingly monstrous” insurgency that threatens food security in many parts of the country.”[72]  To add to the chaos, Nigerian security forces have used indiscriminate heavy-handed tactics as part of their counter-insurgency strategy.  The result has been a positive increase in legitimacy for Boko Haram, a decline in support for the government, and a worsening security situation for the average Nigerian in the north.

Although Boko Haram’s area of operations and support base have remained mostly in the country’s northeastern states, its actions have had strategic consequences.  Perhaps most notable was its August 26, 2011 vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on a UN compound in Abuja.  The blast reportedly killed over 20 people and wounded nearly three-times as many.  Also noteworthy was its April 15, 2014 operation where it kidnapped over 275 female secondary school students in Chibok, Borno state.

Organized Criminal Networks

Transnational Organized Criminal networks, TOC, can be defined as ““crimes that are not only international (crimes that cross borders between countries), but crimes that by their nature involve border crossings as an essential part of the criminal activity. They also include crimes that take place in one country, but their consequences significantly affect another country’”.[73]  Networks engage in narcotics trafficking, natural resource smuggling, and bank robbery. In addition to narcotics, these groups have also trafficked firearms, people, artifacts, stolen vehicles; have engaged in money laundering and advance fee and credit fraud.[74]  TOC in Nigeria is of a different breed than many other organized crime networks.  Nigerian organized crime is “’loose, fluid alliances driven by specific criminal projects.’”[75]  Partnerships form on an adhoc basis in pursuit of a defined goal and then dissolve after completion of a job.[76]  Though these groups may compete with each other at times, there is always an option to partner if the goal is in parties’ interests.[77]

The environment for organized crime is made more conducive by Nigeria’s record of corruption and impunity.  Former President Obasanjo himself admitted that Nigerian elected leaders have, “’broken the law [and] breached the constitution as a matter of routine.’”[78]  Because corruption runs so deep in the Nigerian political structure and because it has been going on for so long (siphoning publicly-intended funds for private gain greatly increased starting in 1951, when a colonial constitution brought regional politics into the power and funding structure), it has been suggested that it has evolved from “organized crime” to “state crime.”[79]  State crime, as defined by William J. Chambliss to the American Society of Criminology, is “acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state officials in the pursuit of their job as representatives of the state.”[80]  If there is an increasingly imperceptible line between governing by rule of law and governing by maintenance of personal networks of powerful individuals unresponsive to established democratic institutions, it will be important for analysts and other actors to acknowledge this shifting reality in order to better engage with the environment.  Three of the most prevalent branches of TOC are discussed below.

Islamic Religious Leaders

Islam is the dominant religion in the Muslim north of Nigeria and Islamic religious leaders exercise significant influence in the region. During the British colonial period, the north was preserved as an Islamic region with its own local governance structures. Christian missionaries did not make it to the north, bringing their schools and education models such as was found in the south. Schools or madrassas set up by current Islamic religious leaders educate the largest portion of the population. Though these leaders enjoy dominance, within the Muslim community, there are many ethnic divides, with the minorities resenting the majority’s rule.[81]  Islamic religious leaders of the north have by and large supported local legislation that upholds Shariah law. They sometimes fearfully stave off the influence of Westernization by rejecting laws, governing models, and social customs that are associated with the West.[82]

Islamic religious leaders have also played a part in local conflicts. Conflicts over cattle rustling, resources, territory, and political positions are influenced and sometimes divided and simplified along religious lines, with Muslims and their leaders fighting against Christians.[83]

The local Islamic leader is called an Imam. Imams stand in front of worshippers at mosque to lead Friday prayers and give sermons. They are the local authority officiating in Islamic ceremonies and apply Islamic law to individuals.[84]  Imams in Islam and in Northern Nigeria carry a lot of credence. In the caliphate tradition of Islam, a political leader is also the religious leader. When the governor of Zamfara, a northeast Nigerian state, was asked if he wanted to become an Imam, he replied, “’I am already an Imam. You see in Islam, as a governor I should be the Chief Imam of the state, but because I do not possess the knowledge required to be the Chief Imam, I am still learning and hope that one day, I will become the Chief Imam of Nigeria, not Zamfara alone.’”[85]  Imams enjoy a lot of public trust, respect, and power in northern Nigeria.

Northern Christians

Christians arrived in the north mainly through missionary efforts in colonial times that continued at a reduced rate through independence in the second half of the 20th century.[86]  After the British colonized and conquered northern Nigeria, they left most Islamic structures in place and, not wanting to upset the status quo, even discouraged conversions to Christian faiths.[87]  However, some mission groups were not to be deterred and missionaries from Europe, the US, and Canada all made their way north.[88]

Today, northern Christians are a minority in northern Nigeria. Since the reintroduction of Shariah law in the early 2000s, most Christians in the north have felt threatened and marginalized.[89]  One life-long resident of Kaduna, one of the largest cities in the north, Obadiah Diji, recounted the integration across religious lines that used to be a source of pride for Kaduna. Children attended the same schools, neighborhoods were not segregated, and intermarriages happened without negative repercussions. He recalls this integration shifted beginning in 2000, when Kaduna faced religious conflict he attributed to the introduction of Islamic law.[90]

Many attacks on churches have also terrorized Christian residents of the north. Most of these have taken place in the northeast region and a majority of them can be attributed to Boko Haram. However, other groups also claim responsibility for some burnings and attacks.[91]  Now, Christians have felt a significant change in life style and security. Some churches in the northeast especially have metal detectors and women are discouraged from bringing purses or bags so a bomb cannot be disguised easily.[92]  Christians have also carried our reprisal attacks on Muslim majorities, bringing the situation more and more to what many analysts describe as similar conditions to Biafra during the civil war of the 1960s.[93][94]  Now, it is common to see monthly clashes between Muslim and Christian groups all over the north.

Refugees and IDPs

The CIA World Factbook estimates the total number of displaced Nigerians to be 3.3 million, due to a wide range of causes, including Boko Haram and other terrorist attacks in the north, strife over the Christian-Muslim divide in the middle belt region, and a wide range of other factors in the coastal regions, including political violence, cattle rustling, flooding, and resource competition.[95]  Internal displacement is typically short term, however, the Council on Foreign Relations reported that during an 18-month period from 2013-2014, around 350,000 were displaced, with 290,000 of that number internally and the rest fleeing as refugees to bordering countries.[96]  With this high volume of displaced persons or refugees, Nigeria has experienced significant brain drain since independence in the 1960s.[97]  Migrants in the north of Nigeria typically move north through the Sahara to the Mediterranean coast before crossing into Europe, while migrants in the South and middle belt often move from rural to city and from city to the US, UK, or other European nations.[98]

Since independence in 1960 and the advent of democracy in 1999, the government has recognized the brain drain of Nigerian citizens to the US, UK, and other European countries as a detriment to Nigeria’s development. In 2000, then President Obasanjo organized the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO), with chapters in the US and UK as a mechanism for the diaspora to assist in Nigeria’s development.[99]

IDPs (internally displaced persons) are ubiquitous in Nigeria, including northern Nigeria. Some of these IDPs migrate as a result of ethnic or other conflict. Since the harsh, repressive military dictatorship ended in 1999, groups that were formerly kept in check by the government became more violent. As a result, 3.2 million IDPs were logged between 2003 and 2008 by Nigeria’s internal National Commission for Refugees.[100]  Clashes between Boko Haram and government forces in the northeast account for some of the movement of IDPs. Other factors include flooding, ethnic conflict over cattle rustling, and groups leaving conflict sites in the Niger River Delta where oil benefits are being fought over.[101]  The Nigerian government has no policy for setting up camps or providing services to IDPs.[102][103]  This can create more unrest, undue pressure on city and state institutions, and further motivations for Nigerians to leave the country to find more opportunity elsewhere. It also interrupts planting cycles in the north, where food insecurity is cyclic and the advancing Sahara creates an even more drained economy.[104]  Additionally, since the adoption of Shariah law by all 12 northern states, Christians have felt out of place and marginalized, further leading to migrant movements in and outside Nigeria.[105]

The migration of IDPs and refugees typically involves a two-stage process. Nigerians migrate from rural to urban and from urban to international. Those with education and money typically migrate to North America or Western Europe, particularly the US or UK. Nigerians with fewer economic resources will typically try reaching Western Europe through circuitous routes taking them across the Sahara to North Africa and then boarding unstable boats heading for Western Europe.[106]  A few follow family or ethnic lines to Sudan where many Hausa from northern Nigeria migrated over the centuries.[107]

Nigeria also receives refugees from other West African countries, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, however these refugees are comparatively few (1,200 in 2009) and mostly stay in the south and middle belt regions.[108]

Nigerian migration also shares a portion with human trafficking. Boys are trafficked for forced labor and begging while women and girls are trafficked for domestic work and prostitution.[109]

Issues

            The issues these parties are in conflict over classify under both realistic and non-realistic conflicts. Realistic conflict is conflict about something tangible, such as land, money, and access to resources.[110] Non-realistic conflict is conflict spurred after an aggressive manifestation of an unresolved emotion. This includes conflict stemming from reprisal or revenge killings, feeling guilty or unjustly accused of wrong doing, or fear of impending attack. The realistic and non-realistic conflict issues are expanded below.

Realistic Conflicts

Some realistic conflict causes in Nigeria, especially northern Nigeria include conflicts over resources, money, power and corruption, Western ways of life, territory, food security, and defense against militant groups.

The most prominent conflict over resources and their equal distribution in Nigeria is being fought in the Niger River Delta.  Local groups have taken up arms and illicit activity in order to gain a share of the oil profits and ensure better living conditions from the oil companies extracting oil and polluting their region.  In the north, resource battles are persisting for water and food security, however, movements and violent groups have not specifically connected grievances over these issues to their causes.

Money and its equal distribution is a seeming byproduct of the corruption in Nigerian politics. Ogas or Big Men work in a system of patrimony to reward or punish each other by granting or denying access to funds, resources, or other money-making engines.[111]

Power is fought over constantly. Traditionally, there has been an unspoken agreement between the Muslim north and the Christian South to alternate presidents.[112] However, when President Goodluck Jonathan won the presidential election after fulfilling most of the presidential term of his deceased Muslim predecessor, many on the Muslim side felt he had taken advantage of this gray area and overstepped this unspoken agreement in Nigerian politics. With an upcoming presidential election in February 2015, [we need to update this as we are past this date] where Jonathan is running again, many on both the Muslim and Christian sides believe he will “win” again, which may influence many groups in the country to engage in violence or war.[113][114]  Hand in hand with power balances in Nigeria is corruption.  As a bread basket, oil-rich economy that is the largest in Africa, Nigeria is very wealthy, yet that wealth does not reach the majority of the population.  Corruption is the major culprit explaining why so many in this country do not have even basic needs met.

Territory is a realistic conflict, as seen in Boko Haram’s efforts to create a new caliphate in the region, as well as periodic tensions in the southeast of Nigeria, where the Biafra Civil War was fought over secession in 1967-1970. The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) is a separatist group that campaigned for a state independent of Nigeria.[115]

Migrations and food security exacerbate each other in Northern Nigeria. Physical insecurity for farmers has led to food insecurity, as farmers either migrate to new regions or when local farmers are forced to eat seed for the upcoming growing season after sharing available food with IDPs driven out by Boko Haram.[116]

Finally, attacks from militant groups, such as Boko Haram in the northeast and north central areas, MASSOB in the south east, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the south, are just some of the armed groups Nigerian peoples are dealing with. Almost sixty percent of farmers have fled the Lake Chad region in the northeast to escape violence between Boko Haram and government forces.[117]  There are several realistic conflict issues affecting different regions of Nigeria, however, there are also many significant non-realistic conflict issues affecting these regions.

Non-Realistic Conflicts

For non-realistic conflict issues in Nigeria, we will focus solely on northern Nigeria as our region of interest and intervention. Non-realistic conflict issues in northern Nigeria include the emotions that lend to reprisal killings after religiously targeted attacks, the fear of Westernization, the fear of Shariah law, the feeling in the north of alienation from the government in Abuja, and the feelings in the north about marginalization and impoverishment.

Reprisal killings in the north have typically occurred in response to an attack on a church or sometimes a mosque and serve to vent emotions and send a message intended to defend against future attacks.[118]  Many northern Christians perpetrate reprisal killings or mosque attacks after church burnings or bombings. Boko Haram is just one militant group that has begun targeting northern churches with suicide bombers and other forms of attack.[119]  Nigeria used to be a model for religious toleration in West Africa, where Christians and Muslims lived side by side.[120]

Similarly, a fear of Westernization infiltrating and soiling Islamic ways of living have motivated some Muslims in the north to defend against such threats.  Some have radicalized and use aggressive or violent acts to prevent Westernization.  Some defended against this threat of diluting Islam with corrupt, Western morals by instituting Shariah law in the twelve northern, predominantly Muslim provinces.  This has prompted the fear developing among some northern Christians, and political backlash from Abuja.  Abuja justice ministers have argued against adopting Shariah, saying that one Nigerian should not be punished more heavily than another Nigerian for the same crime.[121]  Both Abuja’s distance, lack of support for Shariah, and lack of services and protection in the north have contributed to a sense of distance and marginalization from the federal government.[122][123]  The north is noticeably less developed and more impoverished than other regions in Nigeria. This, combined with President Goodluck Jonathan’s status as a Christian from the Delta region, who has become president for what many see as two terms, also contributes to the frustration associated with an unresponsive and indifferent federal government in Abuja.[124]

Objectives

            The objectives these parties in northern Nigeria strive for can be simplified into maintaining or changing the status quo. Among these parties, in favor of maintaining the status quo are some in government, organized criminals and most Islamic religious leaders and in favor of changing it are international aid organizations, some in government, Boko Haram, northern Christians and refugees and IDPs.

Those in power in the government in Nigeria are more averse to changing the precarious status quo because they are currently benefiting from the system. Organized crime networks are diverse but in the corrupt governance structure that Nigeria provides, they can engage in more activity with impunity.  They also are in favor of maintaining the status quo.  It is to their benefit to keep the system opaque, patrimonial, and unregulated.

Islamic religious leaders in the north cannot be looked at as a monolith. There is competition coming from Borno in the northeast contending for legitimacy as a caliphate (championed by militant Islamic groups) against Sokoto’s legitimacy in the northwest as the first and only caliphate in the region.[125]  Islamic leaders in the Borno favor retaining the status quo in retaining Shariah law and continuing to establish Islamic dominance in the region. In the northwest, our region of interest in Sokoto, Islamic leaders also favor maintaining the status quo in maintaining Shariah law; however, there is not a lot of information of favorability toward the militant jihadist movements in the northwest or if they support the peaceful coexistence and present state of religious life.

Boko Haram, with their political message and shocking kidnappings, attacks, and violence, is clearly campaigning to change the status quo. Christians in the north have experienced a sharp change in quality of life since the adoption of Shariah law and are in favor of changing the status quo to promote more tolerance and peace in the region, including assurances that they will not be second class or marginalized citizens under the changing atmosphere of politics in northern Nigeria. IDPs and refugees remain a dark figure with little voice in the region. It is likely, as transitory seekers of refuge, that many IDPs and refugees favor a change in status quo that leads them to more protection from the causes of migration, including cessation of fighting in northeastern Nigeria, protection from cattle rustling and flooding, and other services, as well as economic opportunity and integration that would help refugees repatriate or integrate.

Means

            Now that we understand the objectives behind many of these groups’ actions, we’ll turn to understanding the ways in which they achieve their objectives. These means for attaining goals are largely characterized by what Anatol Rapoport (1960) termed fights, games, and debates. Fights are where conflict parties treat each other as enemies and use destructive means to achieve their goals. Games, however, are largely engaged in for the purpose of outwitting one’s opponent. The archetypal example of this are spies and espionage activities. Finally, debates are largely held in political and diplomatic spheres where opponents endeavor to persuade one another (Sandole 2012).

Different means are used by different parties and sometimes change depending on the setting.  In our region of study, aid organizations and NGOs use debates to affect change in the Sokoto area.  It is important to note that the persuasion these organizations take part in includes persuasion through verbally negotiating projects but also persuasion through completed projects and the effects these have on the area.

The central government engages in games predominantly in individuals’ bids for power.  Officially, it engages in debates in the public sphere.  Possibly, through personal patrimony networks, some politicians engage in fights in similar ways ogas do, by creating personal networks that opportunistically engage in crime and violently protect their share of the market.

The Sokoto Caliphate, with little hard power but highly respected in the region, relies on persuasion through debates.  The caliphate itself has a strong literary tradition as well, which adds to this party’s ability to leverage and persuade populations in northern Nigeria.[126]

Boko Haram clearly uses fights as its primary means in conflict, but it also couples it with a strong political message that border on debates.  There is not a tradition of Boko Haram listening to opposing parties, but at least one sided debates get carried on.  Through its robberies, kidnappings, attacks, and expulsions of large populations, there is no doubt Boko Haram uses fights as its primary conflict means.

In this conflict, organized crime networks use fights and games to achieve their goals.  Organized criminals often include ogas, wealthy, violent crime bosses with an extensive patrimonial network, at the heads of their organizations.  Ogas use games with other ogas.  There are two unwritten rules that ogas do not kill other ogas and an oga never brings another oga to justice.  These games turn to fights when it comes to employees of other ogas or when organized crime bosses interact with groups outside their crime system.  Ogas are free to fight and kill employees of other ogas. [127]

Islamic leaders in the north of Nigeria and northern Christians, however, principally use debates as primary means of conflict and a few use fights.  In 2007, the Sultan of Sokoto and the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria jointly called for peaceful elections. The Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammadu Sa’adu Abubakar, revived the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council to rebuild bridges in communities and make conflict resolution mechanisms in the north.[128]  However, some Imams of radical madrassas in the northeast have employed fights as their principle conflict means.[129]  Boko Haram is certainly the poster child of these violent, jihadist movements, however, many claim they are not Islamic.  Northern Christians also employ fights chiefly as retaliatory actions against militant attacks by radical Islamist groups.[130]

Refugees and IDPs in northern Nigeria do not have much voice in society and almost do not employ any means of conflict.  However, a few effort have been made that show these groups use debates more than any other means.  The Nigerian federal government set up NIDO (Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization) which networks with Nigerians abroad to engage them in Nigerian development.[131]  However, as far as refugees or IDPs within Nigerian borders, little effort has been made concerning them and they are so far almost voiceless actors. The federal government has mostly been involved in either voluntary or forced repatriation and integration efforts with little attention paid to returning IDPs to their homes or setting up refugee camps.[132]

Preferred Means of Conflict Handling

            Conflict handling deals with how parties prefer to enter and engage in the conflict space. The conflict handling methods we use to classify parties in northern Nigeria come from Thomas’s work and is seen expanded on the below continuum:[133]

Conflict Handling
 

 

As seen above, aid organizations seem to either engage with conflict parties in a collaborative or compromising fashion, or they exit the area, making them conflict avoidant.  These groups rely on relationships to complete their work.  Therefore, their preferred conflict handling methods will always be on the higher end of relationship preserving.  However, when the security situation is too threatened, many organizations are forced to avoid or leave the conflict.

The central government responds in a confrontational manner in some cases and collaborative in others.  Towards MEND, Boko Haram, or other extremist groups, it is very confrontational.  However, there have been efforts to collaboratively increase infrastructure and decrease corruption in recent years.[142]

The Sokoto Caliphate also relies on relationships and so will tend towards collaboration, accommodation, or sometimes cooperation on this scale.  John Paul Lederach underscores the importance of relationship as both a cause and basis for solution to a conflict.[143]  Engaging in human interactions and building meaningful relationships can be a basis for conflict resolution and is essential for collaboration.  Cooperation is different from collaboration in that cooperation emphasizes compromise that often produces the lowest, acceptable solution agreeable to both parties, but ends up being what neither party really wants.  Collaboration is when both parties assert their interests but works so that the other party can achieve their interests as well.  It has also collaborated with the Christian community in the North to build societal bridges.

Boko Haram, as manifest in its numerous attacks, coercive actions and statements, and belligerent attitude, seems to prefer a confrontational conflict handling method.

Organized crime networks chiefly use confrontational or collaborative conflict handling methods, depending on the situation.  If there is opportunity for cooperation for a business deal or project, collaboration is often used.[144]  Confrontation is preferred if other parties or ogas are in the way of one network’s prerogative.[145]

Islamic religious leaders in the north and northern Christians use both confrontation but prefer collaboration. As stated earlier, the Sultan of Sokoto and the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria called for a peaceful election period in 2007 and reconvened the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council to provide for more dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms.[146]  However, clerics sympathizing with Boko Haram or angry northern Christians after being attacked will resort to supporting confrontation, though it seems the preferred style of Boko Haram supporters and not necessarily the preferred style of northern Christians.[147][148]

Refugees and IDPs handle conflict through avoidance or accommodation. Many IDPs are forced to leave areas due to conflict and thereby avoid it. Other groups that are repatriated as illegal migrants from Nigeria to other countries are compliant and accommodating with authorities who reclaim them to Nigeria.[149]  It is unclear what these groups’ preferred method of conflict handling is, as both situations seem to put them as being acted on rather than acting.

Conflict Environment

            The conflict environment is the space in which a conflict is framed and therefore influences the way in which the conflict is understood and the rules or assumptions it plays out under.  The various spheres we consider are environmental, historical, cultural, economic, political, and institutional, as well as looking at whether the environment is an exogenous or endogenous conflict environment.[150]  An endogenous conflict environment is a conflict space in which protocols exist to keep a steady, stable state and includes conflict resolution mechanisms; exogenous environments do not have such mechanisms or features.[151]

Parties with endogenous conflict environments include organized crime networks, Islamic religious leaders, and northern Christians. Organized crime networks are self-sustaining and have their own mechanisms for maintaining themselves and rules that govern interactions. Islamic religious leaders and Christians in the north are both governed by religious systems that provide for their own maintenance and conflict resolution mechanisms.  These two major religions in the north have also formed the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council that works, in part, as an interfaith forum for conflict resolution in the north.[152]

IDPs and refugees exist in an exogenous conflict environment.  They receive little support from the Nigerian government and flee situations in a disempowered state.  There are few mechanisms IDPs and refugees have access to in Nigerian society to utilize to resolve conflict.

3PF: Pillar 2 [revise]

With this thorough grounding in understanding conflict elements explored in Pillar 1, we will now turn to Pillar 2 to better understand conditions contributing to these conflicts.

Individual [I will expand on this]

Our Area of Operations in Sokoto and northwest Nigeria includes a relatively peaceful region compared to neighboring regions in the east or south of Nigeria, however, there are still several factors influencing individuals in this area that could lead to a greater manifest conflict process.  These include neuroscience, psychology, and religion.

Tim Phillips in his TED Talk touches on the connection between neuroscience and social conflict.  Sacred values, deeply held, core beliefs, when under threat, threatens the identity of a person. A person that feels marginalized or excluded feels insecurity and it has been shown that rational thought is not possible if the brain feels unsafe. [153]   This relates to the population in northern Nigeria because marginalized populations can sometimes be excluded which is a main driver of violence. Religious or ethnic populations, if they feel shut out from society, can begin to lash out in order to guarantee security.  Creating mechanisms so that all individuals in the northwest region of Nigeria feel social inclusion may go a long way in preventing violence from breaking out.

Psychologically, perceptions of one’s role in a society affects how one interacts in it and any sense of accomplishment or satisfaction.  Let’s take, as one example, breadwinners in northwest Nigeria view their role as essential in providing food for their families.  If an individual does not feel like it is possible to provide, as their identity demands, this threatens individuals’ needs as described in Burton’s Basic Human Needs.  Particularly, with an inability to provide for families, breadwinners would experience a deprivation of security and identity and would likely not be able to progress.[154]  Conflict is more likely to break out if individuals do not feel their needs are being met.

Religion will be discussed later on the societal level, but it also has an effect on the individual level.  Religion identifies individuals with certain groups and if those groups stop interacting positively and start to cleave, conflict lines may be drawn along religious lines.  Religion also influences individuals’ motivations.  There is fear that the ideas and grievances of Boko Haram adherents will find fertile ground in other Nigerian Muslims in the northwest.

Societal

On a societal level, family groups, national politics, economics, and cultural, sociological, and historical elements should be considered to better understand conflict causes.

Tribal and kinship ties affect social groups in northwest Nigeria.  Family relations greatly influence roles and responsibilities and consequent actions of individuals in a social unit.  Individuals born within Hausa families will receive a different socialization than that of persons born in a Fulani group.  Different expectations and opportunities will be tied to both.  If ethnic lines become aggravated or begin to cleave in this area, each family group will influence how people in that group view and behave in a conflict.

In national politics, Nigerians have an unwritten power sharing agreement to alternate between Muslims and Christians taking presidential office. In 2010, then vice president Goodluck Jonathan became president following the illness and death of the Muslim president Umaru Yar’Adua.  In 2011, Jonathan ran for president again and won, violating the unwritten agreement of alternating presidents.[155]  He is running for reelection again in February 2015.  If reelected, as many think will likely happen, it will further aggravate the political situation and likely cause more conflict and increased tensions.[156]

Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy, with an average 7% growth rate per year.  Its booming population at 170 million and counting indicates future growth potential.[157]  However, Nigeria is riddled with poverty, corruption, crony capitalism, massive economic disparity, and is resource cursed.  Nigeria is a rentier state, with 52% of its GDP coming from oil exports.[158]  Rentierism has been shown to lead to a fragile, non-diversified economy and a government with little accountability to the people as taxes do not chiefly fund government operations.  Additionally, illicit economies, such as arms, drugs, and human trafficking, advance fee fraud, money laundering, and bank robbery have, to an extent, become interdependent on each other and the licit economy in some sectors.[159][160]  Northern Nigeria is not immune, home to both poverty and a lack of governmental institutions, rank disequilibrium and relative deprivation, where play a role in this economically challenged region.[161] [162]  Rank disequilibrium occurs as the poor local economy does not support a youthful population entering the skilled workforce, leaving a sector with skills far surpassing their employment.  Additionally, Nigerians in the north are aware of the affluence of other Nigerians in Abuja and other regions, and their expectation for their own affluence begins to rise without an accompanying rise in actual affluence.  This creates the disharmony inherent in relative deprivation.

As stated under Pillar 1, some Islamic religious leaders also play a role in local conflicts. With increasing uneasiness and intolerance between Christians and Muslims in the north, at times, local conflicts cleave along community lines, and both Islamic and Christian leaders become leaders to their communities in opposition to one another. These community conflicts have been over cattle rustling, resources, territory, and political positions.[163]

Culturally, northern Nigeria, home of Boko Haram in the northeast, has pushed a cultural counter movement resisting Westernization.  Even “conflicts over resources, cattle, land, and political offices have often taken on a religious coloration, with Muslims pitted against Christians.”[164]  This has led to increased religious intolerance.[165]  It is feared these trends of intolerance, violence, and cultural backlash will reach the economic hub of the north, Kano, and pass into the northwest Sokoto region.

As previously discussed, the Sokoto Caliphate had a huge impact on our region of interest in northwest Nigeria, as well as on northern Nigeria in general.  A caliphate is a political unit ruled by a caliph, who is a religious and political leader, and Shariah law.  The Islamic principles that the Sokoto Caliphate was founded on include a belief that humankind is divided into “the unbelievers and the believers,” it is a duty to give allegiance to a caliph, and the duty for the caliph to uphold Shariah law and make decisions in council or shura.[166] [167] [168]  Sokoto did not have a standing army, but relied on the tribes for protection and enforcement.  This was a reciprocal relationship.  According to some, the tribes offered protection because they respected the caliph and trusted his dispensing of Shariah law.[169] [170]  Additionally, the Sokoto Caliphate was built on a strong literary and discourse tradition, with the first leaders writing treatises and responding to the ideas raised in these treatises with more written works.[171]  Borno and northeast Nigeria did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sokoto Caliphate.  It is theorized that the rise of Boko Haram is in part influenced by an old rivalry between the Sokoto and Borno regions of the area, with Boko Haram’s native Borno competing for legitimacy as an Islamic authority in the shadow of an acclaimed caliphate that endured for over a hundred years.[172]

Related to the Sokoto Caliphate is a discussion of the modern presence of Shariah law in Northern Nigeria. Since the beginning of Nigeria’s modern democracy in 1999, twelve northern states adopted Shariah law.[173]  This has led to public strife, often divided along religious lines.[174]  Some sentences based on Shariah law have garnered negative international attention. Babies born out of wedlock or alleged rape cases have precipitated harsh punishments or capital sentences under Shariah law for the women involved.[175]  Following appellate court decisions and international uproar, cases like Safiya Hussaini and Amina Lawal were acquitted on technicalities.[176]  Nigerian national leadership at the time of these high profile cases did not denounce Shariah, however, the justice minister in 2002, Godwin Agabi, commented that Nigerian Muslims should not receive harsher punishments than, “other Nigerians for the same offense.”[177]

Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict theory (PSC) also helps explain some societal elements apparent in the Sokoto region of northern Nigeria. Edward Azar held that internal, social issues within states are the more important causes of conflict and that these issues have four specific preconditions that can trigger conflict. These preconditions are identity group, unmet human needs, similar to John Burton’s theory, the government’s role in satisfying or not satisfying those needs, and international linkages, especially political-economic, that influence society.[178] These preconditions can move more easily to conflict through any set of process dynamics, including “communal actions and strategies, state actions and strategies, and built-in mechanisms of conflict.”[179] Processes involved in communal actions and strategies pertain to how societal groups are made, their goals, and their tactics, which can be on a spectrum of violent to nonviolent. State actions and strategies often tend toward coercive or repressive means, and built-in mechanisms are akin to structural violence or other concepts that explain conflict-prone processes in society.[180] In the Sokoto region, main societal groups are Muslims and Christians with a few tribal divisions. Basic needs of both are still being met, however, relations are becoming more and more strained or threatened. The Nigerians government is not reliable in assuring these basic needs, and with international linkages showing concern for Boko Haram in the northeast and oil in the Niger Delta, it is unlikely they will influence the society in the region to form closer, more integrated communities.

Organized crime plays a significant role in sectors of Nigerian society. Organized crime networks were discussed under parties in Pillar One. The following is a discussion of specific networks from a societal level. Some of these merge onto the international level, which follows next in our discussion of Pillar Two.

Narcotics Trafficking

Nigeria is a transit nation for hard, illegal drugs, such as cocaine and heroin. After drug trade reached a peak in 1983-1984, the government created the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) in 1989 to deal with this problem. Drug smuggling decreased somewhat, but continues to be a lucrative and high volume industry. In 2007, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that cocaine seizures in West Africa amounted to 47 tons and at least $2 billion or around 50 tons of cocaine transit through West Africa, including Nigeria, each year.[181]

Arms Trafficking

The Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970 helped incite an illegal arms trade inside Nigeria. Since then, ethnic conflicts have gained greater momentum with the availability of arms and armed robbery has become one of the most prevalent crimes in Nigeria. Most arms are trafficked over porous borders with neighboring states, particularly Chad and Cameroon in the northeast. These arms inundate the region. In 2004, it was estimated one out of every five illicit weapons in the world was in circulation in sub-Saharan Africa and about ten percent of those weapons were in West Africa.[182]

            The rise of terrorism and terrorist groups has led to a rise in illegal arms sales. Groups such as Ansar Dine, Boko Haram, AQIM, and MUJAO have all begun to flourish and expand in West Africa as a whole and have obtained most of their fire power through the illicit arms trade. This economy feeds on itself. For example, Boko Haram used bank robberies and later ransoms from kidnapping to fund its operations. The arms it used for robbery were largely illegal and the money obtained through these means was in part funneled back into the illicit arms industry in order to obtain more weapons.[183]

To counter the rise of illicit arms trafficking in Nigeria, the Nigerian government has enacted legal checks on arms coming into the country, attempted to better control their borders, revoked licenses from suspected arms dealers, and confiscated arms from criminals.[184]

Human Trafficking

Human traffickers force women into prostitution and children into child labor and slavery. Figures are difficult to obtain for ascertaining accurately how many are trafficked per year, however, legislation exists to punish traffickers and programs have been created to reintegrate trafficked persons into society following skills development courses.[185]

These groups have especially begun to merge with terrorist groups in West Africa, among them, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, and Boko Haram.[186]

 

International

In addition to international conflict causes discussed in JIPOE Step 2, other international causes for the conflicts rising in northern Nigeria are rooted in colonialism.  When the British expanded beyond Lagos colony to incorporate the south, middle belt, and northern regions along the Niger River basin, a disparate swath of territories became one administrative unit.  This unit was dubbed Nigeria by a British journalist in 1897.[187]  Additionally, the British method of Indirect Rule further divided the region, where few British administrators administered governance across the country based on existing, native systems.[188]  As previously discussed, when Lord Lugard first arrived to administer Nigeria in 1914, he left the governmentally developed Sokoto caliphate intact and prevented interference from Christian missionaries or other Western institutions.[189]  However, the southern and middle belt regions lacked significant infrastructure and organization. He divided these regions out and administered a Western styled system of rule.[190]  Without a clear sense of national cohesion, Nigeria benefited little in terms of establishing a national vision or unity under British rule.  This contributes today to aggravated sectarian and ethnic lines.

The British also aided in developing the endemic corruption pervading Nigerian society.  Its roots can be seen in the dash system.  The dash-system grew out of native Nigerian practices where gifts were widely and freely given before a monetized system was introduced by Western powers.  After WWII, Nigeria was heading for independence.  During the transition period, the British dealt large amounts of money to public servants who were not trained in transparency and accounting balances.[191]  By 1956, businessmen practiced the dash system by giving large amounts of money as gifts in order to win contracts.[192]  The dash system today manifests as gratuity or bribes and is often figured into contract budgets in order to pay off the middleman or the officials involved in the business deal.[193]

Thought not as relevant in the north, the conflict in the Niger River Delta region also grows out of international involvement in Nigeria.  The Nigerian federal government sold oil extraction rights to multinational oil companies, which now exploit the resource, pollute the area, and though oil companies give the agreed 80% of its profits back to Nigeria, because of systematized corruption, very little of this money makes it back to the populations living in the delta.[194]  The wealth coming into the Nigerian economy creates expectations for greater prosperity (access to education and healthcare, availability of food and assistance, greater economic wealth) that are not fulfilled in most Nigerian households.[195]  These unmet expectations not only create relative deprivation, but it also ensures a failure to meet basic human needs.  The Niger Delta conflict orbits as a satellite conflict to those in the north, but it has the potential to influence northern perceptions and possibly exacerbate relationships and lead to greater conflict in the north.

Global/Ecological

There are many ecological and global conditions that contribute to conflict causes in northern Nigeria.  Many of these ecological and environmental concerns can be found in our discussion of the JIPOE Step One.  Here, we will focus on global concerns not previously mentioned.

Food security is a special problem in northern Nigeria.  Boko Haram’s attacks in the northeast have prompted IDP migrations, which strain the resources in regions they move to.  Both Boko Haram attacks and the emigration of farmers have delayed or cancelled planting for the recent growing season and forced some to eat their seed corn, after sharing available food with floods of IDPs in the region.[196]  Climate change and desertification in the north also threaten growing seasons and yield per hectacre of land.  ,

Additionally, desertification and the advancing Sahara produce diminishing crop yields and lead to increasingly greater food insecurity.  Flooding and ethno-religious conflicts put added pressure on conflict conditions, creating a more fragile and intense conflict space that contribute to the conflict cycle. [197]

The spread of Boko Haram in the northeast is the closest conflict to northwest Nigeria, which could likely spill over to this demographically, economically, and environmentally similar region.  Boko Haram has been reported to be one manifestation among many of a political Islam and violent, jihadist extremism. In his book, Accidental Guerrilla, David Kilcullen defines a global jihadist movement as a global insurgency that uses terrorist tactics.[198]  This global insurgency is rolling through other countries, most of which have regions of poor governance and economic deprivation, such as ISIL in Syria and Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan and FATA Pakistan, and Daru Islam in Indonesia.  Though it is not clear exactly what conditions are leading to these disparate, loosely connected manifestations of global jihadist insurgency, at least some correlated conditions that appear in areas where these insurgencies are seen are poor governance, an economically depressed region, and lack of vision or hope for the future.[199]

Conclusion

To conclude, we will summarize what this information on Nigeria and northern Nigeria means in terms of conflict analysis and what it could mean for a Pillar 3 and JIPOE Step 4 intervention.  Cobbled together as disparate territories and ruled separately for decades by British colonial rule, Nigeria is a divided society.  Its government and societal corruption saturates most if not all levels of government.  Wide economic disparity exists, with a middle class only appearing in Lagos.[200]  The predominantly Muslim north is on average poorer and more poorly educated than their Christian cohorts to the south.  The north has a few climate zones, the northern most of which is undergoing desertification and threatening crop yields.  A rising insurgency from Boko Haram has caused massive violence and forced many to flee their homes in the north east, preventing many farmers from planting crops and thereby creating cyclic food shortages.  Sokoto in the northwest is separated from the northeast by Kano, a large city of over 3.5 million people.  Sokoto is the home of the former Sokoto Caliphate, an institution not reinstated after Nigerian independence in 1960, but still stands as a source of history and strength to the region, particularly in cultural contrast to the violent and jihadist actions of Boko Haram.  Sokoto is also the recipient of many existing international aid programs, many of which focus on food security and health.  These programs have been met with various success rates.  A possible intervention, aimed at preventing conflict from spreading to the Sokoto region and building up resilience to conflict at all levels in the area, may include targeting threatened basic human needs through food security, nurturing cross-cultural ties between dissimilar ethnic or religious communities, increasing access to clean water, or increasing representation at all levels of government for moderate Muslim voices.  We look forward to exploring these and other interventions using JIPOE and 3PF in the coming paper.

[1] Dennis J. D. Sandole, Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World (Cambridge (U.K.) and Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2010), 56.

[2] Ibid, 68.

[3] U.S. Military, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JP 2-01.3) (Pentagon: June 2009), II-1.

[4] Ibid, II-68-II-69.

[5] Ibid, II-69.

[6] Ibid, II-9.

[7] U.S. Military, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JP 2-01.3) (Pentagon: June 2009), XiX.

[8] Dennis J. D. Sandole, Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World (Cambridge (U.K.) and Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2010), 58-59.

[9] Dennis J. D. Sandole, Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World (Cambridge (U.K.) and Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2010), 60.

[10] Galtung, Johan. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-91.

[11] Ibid, 60-61

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid, 62-63

[14] Ibid, 65

[15] Ibid, 64

[16] Rapoport, Anatole. Fights, Games, and Debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960.

[17] Dennis J. D. Sandole, Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World (Cambridge (U.K.) and Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2010), 64.

[18] Thomas, K. “Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument,” in The Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. M. Dunnett. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975.

[19] “Leadership and Influence – Instructor Guide: Lesson Plans: Unit IV Conflict Management Styles: Summary.” Leadership and Influence – Instructor Guide: Lesson Plans: Unit IV Conflict Management Styles: Summary. January 1, 1991. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://collections.infocollections.org/ukedu/en/d/Js1011e/13.4.10.html.

[20] Rapoport, Anatol. Conflict in Man Made Environment, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974.

[21] Central Intelligence Agency, “World Factbook: Nigeria,” https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html (accessed November 29, 2014).

[22] Since our private sector peace-building venture focuses on the country’s north central and north western regions, we will focus the remainder of our discussion on the climate zones in these areas.

[23] Public Broadcasting Service, “Sahel,” http://www.pbs.org/wnet/africa/explore/ sahel/sahel_overview.html (accessed November 29, 2014).

[24] Maplecroft, “Climate Change and Environmental Risk Atlas 2015,” http://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2014/10/29/climate-change-and-lack-food-security-multiply-risks-conflict-and-civil-unrest-32-countries-maplecroft/ (accessed November 29, 2014).

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] USAID, “Nigeria: Water,” http://www.usaid.gov/nigeria/water (accessed November 24, 2014).

[28] FAO, “Background Information: Nigeria,” http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/ t3660e/T3660E01.htm (accessed November 24, 2014).

[29] Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Kaduna State,” http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-06-21/north-west-states/62-kaduna-state (accessed December 1, 2014).

[30] Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Resources,” http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-46/2012-11-05-09-52-15 (accessed November 26, 2014)

[31] Federal Republic of Nigeria, “People,” http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-46/people (accessed December 2, 2014).

[32] Ibid.

[33] CIA, World Fact Book: Nigeria, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html (accessed December 2, 2014).

[34] CIA, World Fact Book: Nigeria, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html (accessed December 2, 2014).

[35] Martin W. Lewis, GeoCurrents, “Electorial Politics and Religious Strife in Nigeria,” http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/electoral-politics-and-religious-strife-in-nigeria (accessed December 2, 2014).

[36] Rhett Butler, “Cities and urban areas in Nigeria with population over 100,000,” http://www.mongabay.com/igapo/Nigeria.htm (accessed November 24, 2014).

[37] PBS, “Portraits of Ordinary Muslims: Nigeria,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/muslims/portraits/nigeria.html (accessed November 20, 2014).

[38] Federal Republic of Nigeria, “National Assembly’” http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-06-51/legislative-branch/national-assembly (accessed November 17, 2014).

[39] Ibid.

[40] Eric Brahm, “Latent Conflict Stage” http://www.beyondintractability.org /essay /latent-conflict (accessed November 22, 2014).

[41] Paul Wehr, “Conflict Emergence,” http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/ peace/problem/cemerge.htm (accessed November 23, 2014).

[42] Transparency International, “Global Corruption Barometer – 2013,” http://www. transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=nigeria (accessed November 23, 2014).

[43] Ibid.

[44] World Bank, “Nigeria,” http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria (accessed November 24, 2014).

[45] This category is not equivalent to Western or European standards.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ruchi Gupta, Business Day. “Nigerian middle class: A myth?” http://businessdayonline.com/2014/01/nigerian-middle-class-a-myth/ #.VHPAtYtU2JU (accessed November 24, 2014).

[48] Sandole describes MCP as “a situation where two or more parties, or their representatives, pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals through means designed to undermine the decision-making efficacy of one another.” (Sandole, 57)

[49] Adrienne Klasa, Foreign Policy. “Nigeria’s House of Cards,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/23/nigerias_house_of_cards_growth_boko_haram_inequality (accessed November 24, 2014).

[50] Transparency International, “Nigeria,” http://www.transparency.org/ country/ #NGA (accessed November 24, 2014).

[51] Foreign Policy, “Fragile State Index,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states -2014 (accessed November 23, 2014).

[52] Sandole, 56.

[53] BBC News Africa, “Nigerians living in poverty rise to nearly 61%,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17015873 (accessed December 9, 2014).

[54] The National Bureau of Statistics measures “absolute poverty” as the number of people who can afford only the bare essentials of shelter, food and clothing.

[55] BBC News Africa, “Nigerians living in poverty rise to nearly 61%.”

[56] World Bank, “GDP (current US$),” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator /NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed December 7, 2014).

[57] Ibid.

[58] World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2013),” http://databank.worldbank.org/ data/download/GDP.pdf (accessed December 9, 2014).

[59] UNDP, “About Nigeria,” http://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria /en/home/countryinfo/ (accessed December 6, 2014).

[60] Natural Resource Governance Institute, “Nigeria,” http://www.resource governance.org/countries/africa/nigeria/overview (accessed December 9, 2014).

 

[61] BlackPast.org, “Sultanate of Sokoto (Sokoto Caliphate),” http://www.blackpast.org/gah/sultanate-sokoto-sokoto-caliphate (accessed on October 4, 2013)

[62] Dr. John N. Paden, “The Sokoto Caliphate and its Legacies (1804-2004),” http://www.dawodu.com/paden1.htm (accessed October 3, 2014)

[63] BlackPast.org, “Sultanate of Sokoto (Sokoto Caliphate),” http://www.blackpast.org/gah/sultanate-sokoto-sokoto-caliphate (accessed on October 4, 2013)

[64] U.S. Library of Congress, “Usman dan Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate,” http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/9.htm (accessed October 4, 2014)

[65] John Campbell, Dancing on the Brink (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), 45

[66] Dan Fodio’s jihad also influenced the holy wars in nearby regions and greatly influenced the creation of Islamic states in Senegal, Mali, and Chad.

[67] National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), “Boko Haram,” http://www.nctc.gov/ site/groups/boko_haram.html (accessed November 24, 2013).

[68] Abdullahi Bego, “Religious Sect Invasion,” Daily Trust (Abuja), December 31, 2003 found in Human Rights Watch, “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria.” http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ nigeria1012webwcover.pdf (accessed November 24, 2013).

[69] National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), “Boko Haram,” http://www.nctc.gov/ site/groups/boko_haram.html (accessed November 24, 2013).

[70] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Boko Haram Recent Attacks,” http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/ STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf (accessed October 19, 2014), 4.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Voice of America, “UN: Nigeria’s Boko Haram ‘Increasingly Monstrous’,” http://www.voanews.com/content/un-nigerias-boko-haram-insurgency-increasingly-monstrous-/1871185.html (accessed on October 18, 2014).

 

[73] Onuoha, Dr. Freedom C., and Dr. Gerald E. Ezirim. “”Terrorism” and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies. June 24, 2013. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[74] NgorNgor, Awunah Donald. “Effective Methods To Combat Transnational Organized Crime In Criminal Jusitice Processes: The Nigerian Perspective. “Resource Material Series, no. 58 (2001): 171-82. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[75] Allum, Felia. “Nigerian Organized Crime.” In Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, 127.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid, 128.

[79] Ibid, 139.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ochonu, Moses. “The Roots of Nigeria’s Religious and Ethnic Conflict.” GlobalPost. March 10, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: Predominant sects, or branches, of Islam present in Nigeria; role of Imam and how an individual becomes one; whether Imam has any power, or role, in the issuing of death sentences under Sharia law and, if so, the manner in which a death sentence would be issued and carried out; whether a death sentence issued under Sharia law would be legal under Nigerian law, 28 March 2001, NGA36566.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be7e18.html %5Baccessed 24 November 2014]

[85] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: Predominant sects, or branches, of Islam present in Nigeria; role of Imam and how an individual becomes one; whether Imam has any power, or role, in the issuing of death sentences under Sharia law and, if so, the manner in which a death sentence would be issued and carried out; whether a death sentence issued under Sharia law would be legal under Nigerian law, 28 March 2001, NGA36566.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be7e18.html %5Baccessed 24 November 2014]

[86] Shankar, Shobana. “The Complicated Politics of Conversion in Northern Nigeria.” Africa Is a Country. May 26, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] “Christian Life in Northern Nigeria.” BBC News. November 1, 2012. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Coleman, Isobel. “Islamic Law in Nigeria [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service, Inc.].” Council on Foreign Relations. February 23, 2006. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[92] “Christian Life in Northern Nigeria.” BBC News. November 1, 2012. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[93] Garba, Ibrahim. “Christians Retaliate after Three More Churches Bombed in Nigeria.” The Christian Science Monitor. June 17, 2012. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[94] Coleman, Isobel. “Islamic Law in Nigeria [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service, Inc.].” Council on Foreign Relations. February 23, 2006. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[95] “Field Listing :: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.” Central Intelligence Agency. June 20, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[96] Campbell, John. “Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 18, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/03/18/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-in-northern-nigeria/.

[97] Mberu, Blessing U., and Roland Pongou. “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant.” Migrationpolicy.org. June 30, 2010. Accessed November 29, 2014. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nigeria-multiple-forms-mobility-africas-demographic-giant.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Campbell, John. “Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 18, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/03/18/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-in-northern-nigeria/.

[103] Mberu, Blessing U., and Roland Pongou. “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant.” Migrationpolicy.org. June 30, 2010. Accessed November 29, 2014. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nigeria-multiple-forms-mobility-africas-demographic-giant.

[104] Campbell, John. “Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 18, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/03/18/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-in-northern-nigeria/.

[105] Mberu, Blessing U., and Roland Pongou. “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant.” Migrationpolicy.org. June 30, 2010. Accessed November 29, 2014. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nigeria-multiple-forms-mobility-africas-demographic-giant.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Dennis J. D. Sandole, Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World (Cambridge (U.K.) and Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2010), 60-61.

[111] Campbell, John. Nigeria Dancing on the Brink. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Personal interview by authors, Dr. John Paden, 25 November 2014.

[114] Personal interview by authors, Chuck Onyia, 11 November 2014.

[115] Mberu, Blessing U., and Roland Pongou. “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant.” Migrationpolicy.org. June 30, 2010. Accessed November 29, 2014. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nigeria-multiple-forms-mobility-africas-demographic-giant.

[116] Campbell, John. “Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 18, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/03/18/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-in-northern-nigeria/.

[117] Campbell, John. “Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 18, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/03/18/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-in-northern-nigeria/.

[118] Garba, Ibrahim. “Christians Retaliate after Three More Churches Bombed in Nigeria.” The Christian Science Monitor. June 17, 2012. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[119] Ibid.

[120] “Christian Life in Northern Nigeria.” BBC News. November 1, 2012. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Campbell, John. “Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 18, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/03/18/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-in-northern-nigeria/.

[123] Personal interview by authors, Dr. John Paden, 25 November 2014.

[124] Personal interview by authors, Chuck Onyia, 11 November 2014.

[125] Personal interview by authors, Dr. John Paden, 25 November 2014.

[126] Sulaiman, Ibraheem. The Islamic State and the Challenge of History: Ideals, Policies, and Operation of the Sokoto Caliphate. London: Mansell Pub., 1987.

[127] Campbell, John. Nigeria Dancing on the Brink. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, 26-30.

[128] Ibid, 47.

[129] “Profile: Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau.” BBC News. May 9, 2014. Accessed November 29, 2014.

[130] Garba, Ibrahim. “Christians Retaliate after Three More Churches Bombed in Nigeria.” The Christian Science Monitor. June 17, 2012. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[131] Mberu, Blessing U., and Roland Pongou. “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant.” Migrationpolicy.org. June 30, 2010. Accessed November 29, 2014. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nigeria-multiple-forms-mobility-africas-demographic-giant.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Thomas, K. “Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument,” in The Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. M. Dunnett. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975.

[134] Hanson, Stephanie. “Nigeria’s Creaky Political System.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 12, 2007. Accessed December 1, 2014.

[135] Allum, Felia. “Nigerian Organized Crime.” In Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, 129-133.

[136] “Profile: Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau.” BBC News. May 9, 2014. Accessed November 29, 2014.

[137] Campbell, John. Nigeria Dancing on the Brink. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, 47.

[138] Garba, Ibrahim. “Christians Retaliate after Three More Churches Bombed in Nigeria.” The Christian Science Monitor. June 17, 2012. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[139] Campbell, John. Nigeria Dancing on the Brink. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, 47.

[140] Nossiter, Adam. “As Islamist Militants Advance, Residents Flee a Nigerian City.” The New York Times. September 4, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[141] Mberu, Blessing U., and Roland Pongou. “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant.” Migrationpolicy.org. June 30, 2010. Accessed November 29, 2014. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nigeria-multiple-forms-mobility-africas-demographic-giant.

[142] Hanson, Stephanie. “Nigeria’s Creaky Political System.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 12, 2007. Accessed December 1, 2014.

[143] Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. 26.

[144] Allum, Felia. “Nigerian Organized Crime.” In Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011.

[145] Campbell, John. Nigeria Dancing on the Brink. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011.

[146] Ibid, 47.

[147] Garba, Ibrahim. “Christians Retaliate after Three More Churches Bombed in Nigeria.” The Christian Science Monitor. June 17, 2012. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[148] “Profile: Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau.” BBC News. May 9, 2014. Accessed November 29, 2014.

[149] Mberu, Blessing U., and Roland Pongou. “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant.” Migrationpolicy.org. June 30, 2010. Accessed November 29, 2014. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/nigeria-multiple-forms-mobility-africas-demographic-giant.

[150] Sandole, Dennis J. D. Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. 67.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Campbell, John. Nigeria Dancing on the Brink. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, 47.

[153] Phillips, Tim. “The Neuroscience of Social Conflict | Tim Phillips | TEDxBoston.” YouTube. November 5, 2014. Accessed December 5, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AfljJGTVcKE.

[154] Burton, John W. Conflict: Resolution and Prevention. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990.

[155] Campbell, John. Nigeria Dancing on the Brink. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011.

[156] Personal interview by authors, Chuck Onyia, 11 November 2014.

[157] “Nigeria: Africa’s New Number One.” The Economist, April 12, 2014.

[158] “Nigeria.” Data. January 1, 2014. Accessed December 6, 2014. http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria.

[159] Onuoha, Dr. Freedom C., and Dr. Gerald E. Ezirim. “”Terrorism” and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies. June 24, 2013. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[160] NgorNgor, Awunah Donald. “Effective Methods To Combat Transnational Organized Crime In Criminal Jusitice Processes: The Nigerian Perspective. “Resource Material Series, no. 58 (2001): 171-82. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[161] Sandole, Dennis J. D. Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press ;, 1993. 12.

[162] Sandole, Dennis J. D. Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. 109.

[163] Ochonu, Moses. “The Roots of Nigeria’s Religious and Ethnic Conflict.” GlobalPost. March 10, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[164] Ibid.

[165] Garba, Ibrahim. “Christians Retaliate after Three More Churches Bombed in Nigeria.” The Christian Science Monitor. June 17, 2012. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[166] Sulaiman, Ibraheem. The Islamic State and the Challenge of History: Ideals, Policies, and Operation of the Sokoto Caliphate. London: Mansell Pub., 1987.

[167] Onuoha, Dr. Freedom C., and Dr. Gerald E. Ezirim. “”Terrorism” and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies. June 24, 2013. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[168] Ochonu, Moses. “The Roots of Nigeria’s Religious and Ethnic Conflict.” GlobalPost. March 10, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[169] Steiner, Susie. “Sharia Law.” The Guardian. August 20, 2002. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[170] Sulaiman, Ibraheem. The Islamic State and the Challenge of History: Ideals, Policies, and Operation of the Sokoto Caliphate. London: Mansell Pub., 1987.

[171] Ibid.

[172] Personal interview by authors, Dr. John Paden, 25 November 2014.

[173] Ibid.

[174] Ibid.

[175] Steiner, Susie. “Sharia Law.” The Guardian. August 20, 2002. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[176] “Sharia Court Frees Nigerian Woman.” BBC News. March 25, 2002. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[177] Steiner, Susie. “Sharia Law.” The Guardian. August 20, 2002. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[178] Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts. 3rd ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press ;, 2012. 99-102.

[179] Ibid.

[180] Ibid.

[181] Onuoha, Dr. Freedom C., and Dr. Gerald E. Ezirim. “”Terrorism” and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies. June 24, 2013. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[182] Ibid.

[183] Ibid.

[184] NgorNgor, Awunah Donald. “Effective Methods To Combat Transnational Organized Crime In Criminal Jusitice Processes: The Nigerian Perspective. “Resource Material Series, no. 58 (2001): 171-82. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[185] NgorNgor, Awunah Donald. “Effective Methods To Combat Transnational Organized Crime In Criminal Jusitice Processes: The Nigerian Perspective. “Resource Material Series, no. 58 (2001): 171-82. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[186] Onuoha, Dr. Freedom C., and Dr. Gerald E. Ezirim. “”Terrorism” and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies. June 24, 2013. Accessed November 24, 2014.

[187] Allum, Felia. “Nigerian Organized Crime.” In Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, 128.

[188] Ibid, 128-131.

[189] Ibid.

[190] Ibid.

[191] Ibid, 131.

[192] Ibid, 133.

[193] Allum, Felia. “Nigerian Organized Crime.” In Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, 133.

[194] “Nigeria.” Data. January 1, 2014. Accessed December 6, 2014. http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria.

[195] Sandole, Dennis J. D. Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. 109.

[196] Campbell, John. “Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 18, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/03/18/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-in-northern-nigeria/.

[197] “Nigeria.” UNHCR News. January 1, 2014. Accessed December 1, 2014. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e484f76.html.

[198] Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

[199] Carlson, Stephen. “The Psychology Of Why People Join Terror Movements | Task & Purpose.” Task Purpose. October 15, 2014. Accessed December 6, 2014. http://taskandpurpose.com/psychology-terror-people-join-jihadi-movements/.

[200] Allum, Felia. “Nigerian Organized Crime.” In Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, 129-133.

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